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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MISTY LEEANN PRESTWICH,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43662
JEROME COUNTY NO. CR 2015-1133
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Misty Prestwich was sentenced to a term of five years fixed after pleading guilty
to eluding a peace officer. She contends the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed this sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case. She also
contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for reconsideration of sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 10, 2015, Ms. Prestwich was driving a Dodge Neon on Interstate 84,
when a police officer activated his emergency lights in an attempt to effect a traffic stop.
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(Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.4, 21.) Ms. Prestwich did not stop, but
instead fled. (PSI, p.5.) She later explained she knew she was in trouble because she
did not have a valid driver’s license and because there were outstanding warrants for
her arrest. (PSI, p.5.) Idaho State Police Trooper Michael Hausauer responded to
assist in the pursuit of Ms. Prestwich’s vehicle.

(PSI, p.21.)

Trooper Hausauer

deployed his spikes and Ms. Prestwich swerved toward him in an effort to avoid the
spikes.

(PSI, pp.21-22; 5/25/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.12-25, p.44, Ls.7-10.)

Ms. Prestwich

ultimately crashed into the median and was transported to a hospital via ambulance.
(PSI, pp.4, 22; 5/25/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.12-17.)
Ms. Prestwich was charged by Information with aggravated assault on law
enforcement personnel and eluding a peace officer. (R., pp.40-41.) The State also filed
an Information Part 2 stating it intended to seek an enhanced penalty based on
Ms. Prestwich’s alleged act of using, threatening and/or attempting to use a deadly
weapon in committing the alleged aggravated assault. (R., pp.45-47.)
Ms. Prestwich entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which she
agreed to plead guilty to eluding a peace officer in exchange for dismissal without
prejudice of the aggravated assault count. (R., p.74; 8/25/15 Tr., p.3, Ls.18-23.) The
district court accepted Ms. Prestwich’s guilty plea and sentenced her to a term of five
years fixed—the maximum under Idaho Code § 18-112. (8/25/15 Tr., p.15, L.23 – p.16,
L.5; R., p.79.) The judgment was entered on October 19, 2015, and Ms. Prestwich filed
a timely notice of appeal on October 23, 2015. (R., pp.80-85, 88-91.) Ms. Prestwich
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filed a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of sentence on February 12, 2016.1 She
requested that the district court reduce her sentence to a unified term of five years, with
three years fixed, to mirror the sentence she received in Bannock County for the same
course of conduct as the instant offense. (Motion to Augment, Ex. A, pp.1-2.) The
district court denied Ms. Prestwich’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing on February 16,
2016.
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Prestwich to a
term of five years fixed in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Prestwich’s Rule 35
motion?
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Prestwich To A Term
Of Five Years Fixed In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Ms. Prestwich asserts that, given any view of the facts, her sentence of five years
fixed—the statutory maximum—is excessive. Where, as here, the sentence imposed by
the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834
(2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)). “When a trial court
exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is

The Clerk’s Record does not contain either Ms. Prestwich’s Rule 35 motion or the
district court’s order denying that motion. Simultaneously with the filing of this brief,
Ms. Prestwich is filing a Motion to Augment the Record to include these documents.
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reasonableness.’”

Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).

“A

sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted). “When reviewing the reasonableness
of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of
the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The sentence imposed by the district court on Ms. Prestwich is not reasonable
considering the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, and is not
necessary to protect the public interest. Ms. Prestwich’s conduct of eluding a peace
officer was serious, and certainly misguided. As she described it, she went “into panic
mode” when she saw the police officer’s lights, and chose to flee. (PSI, p.5.) It appears
Ms. Prestwich suffers from anxiety and has a rather extreme “fight or flight” response.
(PSI, pp.14-15.) But Ms. Prestwich did not intend to hurt Trooper Hausauer; her only
intent was to avoid the trooper’s spikes. (PSI, p.5.) Her conduct was criminal, and
deserving of punishment, but does not warrant the statutory maximum.
Ms. Prestwich was 28 years old at the time of the instant offense. (PSI, p.2.)
She has no history of substance abuse and was employed prior to her incarceration.
(PSI, pp.14, 15.) She had previously served five years for eluding a peace officer, and
was discharged from the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections on March 14,
2010. (PSI, p.10.) Ms. Prestwich did not receive any programming during the course of
her prior incarceration and she is clearly in need of professional help rather than a
lengthy term of incarceration. (10/19/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.8-10.)
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At sentencing, Ms. Prestwich’s counsel recommended that Ms. Prestwich be
placed on a rider or be sentenced to a unified term of five years, with one year fixed.
(10/19/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-22, p.15, Ls.9-13.)

This would have been a far more

appropriate sentence, and would have adequately protected the public. In addition to
Ms. Prestwich’s prison term, the district court ordered that Ms. Prestwich’s driving
privileges be suspended for three years following her release from imprisonment.
(R., p.84.) Ms. Prestwich does not contest this portion of her sentence, and asserts that
the fixed term of five years in addition to the three-year suspension of driving privileges
is clearly excessive.
Ms. Prestwich was asked during the presentence investigation if she had any
final comments for the district court. (PSI, p.16.) Ms. Prestwich stated, “I know [I] have
the skills to have a productive life this was a huge eye opener to what can happen in a
moment I take full accountability for my actions and want to move forward with whatever
I need to do.” (PSI, p.16.) In light of this sentiment and considering the nature of the
offense, Ms. Prestwich’s character, and the protection of the public interest, the
sentence imposed by the district court constitutes an abuse of discretion.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Prestwich’s Rule 35 Motion
Ms. Prestwich also asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied
her Rule 35 motion. “A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is
addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court and essentially is a plea for
leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). “The denial of a
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motion for modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction.” Id.; see also State v. Huffman,
144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
In support of her Rule 35 motion, Ms. Prestwich informed the district court that
she had been sentenced in Bannock County to a unified term of five years, with three
years fixed, for the same course of conduct as the instant case. (Motion to Augment,
Ex. A, pp.1-2.) She requested that the district court modify her sentence in the instant
case to mirror the sentence imposed in the Bannock County case. (Motion to Augment,
Ex. A, p.2.) The district court recognized that Ms. Prestwich provided new information
in support of her Rule 35 motion, but nonetheless denied the motion, stating “[t]he mere
fact that the defendant may have received what she would characterize as a more
desired sentence does not mean or suggest that the sentence imposed by this court is
excessive.” (Motion to Augment, Ex. B, pp.2-3.) The district court’s decision constitutes
an abuse of discretion.
It is certainly true that two courts can reach different sentencing decisions based
on the same facts, and that both of those sentences can accurately represent the
statutory goals of sentencing. See Idaho Code § 19-2521. However, it is also true that
two courts can reach different sentencing decisions based on the same facts, but that
one of those sentences is better reasoned, and more accurately represents the
statutory goals of sentencing. Here, the district court abused its discretion in failing to
consider the latter possibility.

The district court should have held a hearing on
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Ms. Prestwich’s Rule 35 motion, and should have considered the basis for the sentence
imposed in the Bannock County case. Ms. Prestwich submits that the district court
abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 motion and failed to reduce her
sentence from the statutory maximum of five years fixed.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Prestwich respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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